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exotic,  but  without  too  much  historical  depth.  Quite  the  contrary,  explains  D. Aigle,
who begins first by reminding us that many historians, beginning with 18th century
Laurent Mosheim or 19th century Abel Rémusat analyzed these letters as the remnants





precisely,   through   its   ability   to   recruit   and   train   clerks   from   different   origins,
Buddhists, Muslims or Nestorian, Armenian or Russian Christians, among others, the
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though   adapted;   but  precisely,   the   second  point   is   that   the  Mongol   chancellery,
through all these cultural traders, was able to use Muslim as well as Christian rhetoric
and  to  convey  Mongol  ideology  through  coranic  or  biblical  citations.  And  this  is  the
main  point:   if  now  we  pass  to  the  second  and  third  point  of  the  paper,  which  deal




been to  distant to  understand each other. Once again, it could quite be the  opposite
way.
3 The second part deals with the “no-negociation” attitude of the great-khans at the time
of   their   splendour.   Here, the   situation   was   extremely   simple:   the   great-khans
considered themselves as the conquerors of the world in the name of the divine force,
and D. Aigle points to the correspondence between Mongols myths or historic vision
and   their  diplomatic  rhetoric.  Hence,  all the  kings  of   the  world  were  expected   to
submit.  This   situation  was   transformed  when   the  Mongol  unity  broke  down.  The
autonomous power of the Ilkhans of Persia, opposed to the Egyptian Mamluks for the
control of the Syrian region, needed an ally, obviously the Latin kingdoms of the West
engaged   in   the   Crusade   movement.   But   in   the   end,   all   of   these   negotiations
accomplished very little, not so much because of a basic inability or understand each
other, but because the papacy and the West trusted neither the Nestorian Christians
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